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The EU is clearly in the process of developing an external dimension to the Area of 
Freedom Security and Justice. This paper focuses on ex. Police and Judicial Co-
operation in Criminal Matters provisions. These developments pose specific legal basis 
issues for the EU, given its complex EU –member state legal relationship, and the 
inter-institutional balance, all reflected in the treaty framework post-Lisbon. New 
Court of Justice rulings are now emerging which will assist in this issue. Equally the 
approach to be taken in developing these relationships will be crucial. This paper 
proposes the adoption of an Onuf style constructivism in order to best capture the 
reality of the process that is developing, and has developed for the ex.PJCCM measures 
internally. This then needs to be allied with a constitutionalism model to ensure a 
balanced development of all three aspects of the Area of Freedom, Security and Justice. 
Keywords: AFSJ, North Africa, competence, constructivism, constitutionalism. 
A. Introduction 
A lot of current research is focusing on the issue of borders. Borders are often not, 
either where they would traditionally be expected to be placed, nor are necessarily 
policed in a traditional manner. Smith has classified borders as being “geopolitical, 
institutional/legal, transactional and cultural boundaries”, (Smith, cited in Zeilinger 
2012, p.70). There is a possibility for a multiplicity of varieties of borders, between 
countries or territories with good working relationships. This paper will focus on the 
relationships across the institutional/ legal borders of the EU with its southern 
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periphery. It will address the evolving area of the external relationship of the EU in 
the Area of Freedom Security and Justice (AFSJ), in particular in ex. Police and 
Judicial Cooperation in Criminal Matters (PJCCM). 
 
The EU has been clearly tasked with engaging with its neighbours in not just 
CFSP but also AFSJ measures. The EU’s external relations in law enforcement and 
counter-terrorism have been developing in the last number of years. The subject 
matter of this paper operates at the intersection of three principal policy documents of 
the EU, the EU’s Internal Security Strategy, the European Union’s Counter-terrorism 
strategy, and the Strategy for the External Dimension of JHA. Operating in the 
background is the EU’s Security Strategy, (Council of the European Union 2005a). 
The EU sees that it cannot operate in isolation from the rest of the world, particularly 
in the AFSJ (Rijken 2011, p.210), leading to what den Boer refers to as “a security 
continuum” (den Boer 2011, p.341). The EU seeks to engage with third countries in 
solving its transnational problems, and addressing the objectives set in its internal 
security strategy, (Zeilinger 2012, p.64).  
 
The overarching policy document currently being used is the EU’s Strategy for the 
External Dimension of the JHA. The key thematic priorities are set out as being 
“terrorism, organised crime, corruption and drugs and to the challenge of managing 
migration flows,” (paragraph 1). Relations with third countries are to develop 
partnerships including “strengthening the rule of law, and promoting the respect for 
human rights and international obligations,” (paragraph 1). Some of the countries 
which the EU would be entering into partnership with would be in more need of 
assistance and reconstruction than the North African states, with which the EU has 
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some fairly advanced legal agreements. The details of these relationships with 
individual neighbouring third states, with the exception of Russia,2 are to be found in 
the Euro-Med agreements and the European Neighbourhood Policy (ENP) action 
plans. However relationships differ from one partner country to another. For example 
Algeria has become a member of the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership, but so far has 
declined the offer of the ENP arrangements. Libya is currently not a member of either 
process. The EU’s Strategy for the External Dimension of Justice and Home Affairs 
(JHA) also talks about the important relationship between JHA, the CFSP, the 
European Security and Defence Policy (ESDP), which would be military in focus. 
While EU military interventions are not normally be expected to be used in the 
context of North Africa, there is recognition in this document that EU police and 
judicial expertise will be “essential to the rebuilding and transformation of weak law 
enforcement institutions and courts systems.” Countries with less weak systems, or 
systems in transition, might also benefit from some assistance, as long as, in the North 
African context, proposals respected the varying Islamic outlooks reflected in their 
legal systems.  
 
The external relations of the EU have “been conceptualised in the academic 
literature as ‘external governance’”, which in the context of the AFSJ has been 
referred to as the “projection of EU rules beyond EU borders” (Lavenex 2011, p.119). 
Using “transgovernmental and intergovernmental channels of cooperation”, with a 
focus on “operational cooperation” and “the extensive use of horizontal network 
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activities among law enforcement authorities and other relevant Member States’ 
agencies in the cooperation,”  (Lavenex 2011, p.120). These developments within the 
EU lend themselves to an Onuf style Constructivist analysis (Kubáklová 1998). 
Constructivism as a tool of analysis developed in the 1990s, emerging from 
International Relations theory, but is increasingly being used in legal analysis. 
Located between rationalists and interpretivists, constructivists examined not so much 
objects, but the meaning that attributed to those objects, with social constructs or 
understandings informing how meaning is so attributed, (Cristol). As constructivism 
was developed in the field of International Relations it examined the meanings that 
societies, or states attributed to international treaties or other arrangements. 
 
Onuf developed a strand of constructivism which advocated that 
“constructivism is a universal experience” (Kubáklová 1998: p.72), and one that we 
cannot avoid, as we are located within one type of society or another. Therefore 
Onuf’s constructivism applies “not simply to the level of states, but to humans in any 
dimension of their social activity, international relations being merely one, albeit an 
extremely important one, among many”, (Kubáklová 1998: p.72).Whether this mutual 
construction of understanding has happened at either the individual, following Onuf’s 
approach, or institutional level, both being highly relevant in the construction of a 
completely new way of cross-border law enforcement provisions, in particular.  
 
In areas where there was no pre-existing legal and practice framework, such as 
in ex. PJCCM matters, when practitioners are asked to build a new legal and practice 
jurisdiction they necessarily bring their own socialised understandings of how to, for 
example, conduct law enforcement operations, and through interaction with their 
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counterparts from other jurisdictions, negotiate a shared understanding as to how a 
transnational law enforcement operation is to work. It is the human beings at the 
interface between the relevant jurisdictions who have “constructed” a new social 
reality. The activities of the Police Working Group on Terrorism and TREVI are cases 
in point, as was the original construction of the Europol Drugs Unit, which started 
operating before its underpinning legislation was enacted, and which eventually 
became Europol. As stated by Lavenex, “Communication and transparency through 
institutionalised interaction are … crucial for the evolution of trust,” trust being 
“central to cooperation in the sensitive matters of JHA,”  (Lavenex 2011, p.122). 
 
However, reflecting the fact that the AFSJ covers not just security provisions, but 
also freedom and justice, external developments with Euro-Med countries in cross 
border law enforcement and justice issues may well run a risk in engaging with 
countries who do not share the basic underlying principles, which underpin all of the 
EU legal and law enforcement structures, namely a shared understanding of the 
tripartite division of power, the rule of law, an independent judiciary, and a basic 
understanding of human rights. This has been pointed out by Cardwell, who refers to 
the “double-edged nature of the EU’s engagement with the Mediterranean partners, 
especially post 9/11,” with the drive to “secure cooperation on crime and terrorism 
despite the Barcelona Process” emphasis on “encouraging reform” (Cardwell 2009, 
p.137). It does have to be pointed out that the Barcelona signatories, in the context of 
the Euro-Mediterranean agreements, undertook, under the heading of “political and 
security partnership” to “refrain from interference in a partner’s internal affairs”, 
while at the same time to “strengthen co-operation in combating terrorism,” (Hakura 
1997, p.342/4). 
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The Onuf’s constructivist approach, of the constant making sense of the world, 
and negotiating that understanding greatly assists the development of structures from 
new, in particular when a number of new initiatives are still on the drawing board, but 
will not assist in the protection of individual rights, which require a more concrete, 
and less fungible understanding of standards and norms. This relationship between the 
preceding constructivist model, and a need for it to be balanced by, certainly from the 
internal, and to a certain extent external, AFSJ perspective, constitutionalism, may 
well lead to a reflexive relationship, with the constitutionalisation of standards and 
norms by the courts, in particular in the post Lisbon legal framework, may lead to 
further construction of shared understandings of what is to operate within the EU’s 
AFSJ. Nevertheless there is a need for the constitutionalisation of the AFSJ to now 
come to the fore, internal to the EU, and externally when engaging, in particular with 
partner counties “which lack the liberal democratic tradition that underpins these 
policies in liberal democracies”, (Lavenex 2011, p.120). Mac Amhlaigh takes and 
interesting approach to the term of constitutionalism, referring to it as “as a forum for 
contestation regarding the values of the political community, where reasonable 
disagreement is articulated and debated,” (Mac Amhlaigh 2011, p.29) . It is arguable 
that at the level of the EU this contestation and debate is only now really getting 
started. In relations with third countries it would be important to ensure that this 
contestation does not undermine the standards and rights which have been developed, 
or are developing at the EU level, and those which have deep roots in the legal 
systems of the different EU member states. Some academics have already approached 
the AFSJ “as part of the constitutional authority of the EU”, (Gibbs 2011, p.83), 
although Gibb’s argument, writing in 2011, is that “there is a “precarious” balance 
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“between an instrumental and a constitutional understanding of the public goods of 
freedom, security and justice”, (Gibbs 2011, p.61). In the context of the AFSJ, 
Howard Gibbs has stated that constitutionalism sets “the challenge to consider … 
relational ways of living as a political community” rather than “seeking a stable, or 
fixed, definition of constitutionalism”, (Gibbs 2011, p.xiv). This is clearly a challenge 
for the developing EU, particularly in the context of the AFSJ, to include its external 
relations, many of whose themes go to the core of political life, and the construction 
of the societies of the EU’s member states. 
 
 
B. The EU’s legal capacity to act 
 
 
A legal analysis of the EU’s capacity to act in external AFSJ provisions is 
necessary, before examining how exactly the EU should act in this area. At first 
glance external relations of the EU would appear to fall within the Common Foreign 
and Security Policy (CFSP), with any agreements likely to be entered into by the EU 
in the matters related to the Area of Freedom Security and Justice (AFSJ) being by 
way of an association agreement provided by Article 217 TFEU. However the CFSP 
chapter in the TEU provides separately for the Union to conclude agreements with 
one or more States or international organisations, under Article 37 TEU. More 
generally, and not restricted to the CFSP chapter of the TEU, Article 8 TEU provides 
that the EU will maintain “a special relationship with neighbouring countries, aiming 
to establish an area of prosperity and good neighbourliness, founded on the values of 
the Union and characterised by close and peaceful relations based on cooperation”. 
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Article 8 TEU implies “a separate kind of status for neighbouring States, rather than 
merely a field of external action,” (Cremona 2008, p.50). Academics are asking 
whether these “agreements with the neighbours” are to be “seen as part of Union 
foreign policy or as something different,” (Dashwood and Maresceau 2008, p.50). 
Equally it could be asked if the concept of “neighbours” only applies to participants in 
the ENP, or whether it also extends to our neighbours when they participate in the 
EuroMed policy. One argument being made for treating the “neighbours” differently 
is that it enhances “the ability of the Union to fine-tune its relationships with key 
groups of third countries,” (Dashwood and Maresceau 2008, p.50). However, as 
Cremona points out, “this is outweighed by the lack of clarity as to what exactly the 
differences entail,” which is added to by the increasing variety of potential legal bases 
for enactment of EU laws and negotiation of external agreements, which can now “be 
found in different places in the Treaties,” (Cremona 2008, p.50). It is arguable that 
agreements with the neighbours could be closer than those provided for by the CFSP, 
and the Article 37 TEU provisions. In addition non-CFSP chapter agreements, or even 
agreements which develop further on an association agreement provided by Article 
217 TFEU could be provided for under Article 8 TEU. A ruling from the CJEU is 
however required to bring clarity to this issue. Article 24 TEU is clear that the CFSP 
will “cover all areas of foreign policy”, so would include Article 8 TEU relationships, 
however it might be argued that Article 8 TEU relationships are a sub-set, but more 
developed type of relationship, which may involve more detailed and advanced 
provisions than would be typical under association agreements under Article 217 
TFEU. 
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Looking outward from the EU, academics find that the EU’s substantive external 
relations “are often difficult to place in [a] precise and accurate legal framework,” 
(Dashwood and Maresceau 2008, p.6). There is a lack of an explicit reference in the 
new legal framework to the external relations of the AFSJ, which Cremona points out, 
is “surprising”, and “might have been expected given its importance” (Cremona 2008, 
p.49). Article 21 TEU deals with the general provisions in the Union’s external action. 
However, a reading of Article 21 TEU itself will not assist in deciding the legal base 
for an external action, leading “to a greater emphasis on the content of a measure,” 
(Dashwood and Maresceau 2008). Particularly problematic are those “relations that 
have been developed with countries in the EU’s proximity,” (Dashwood and 
Maresceau 2008, p.6), such as the EU’s relations with North Africa. It is necessary, 
therefore, to examine recent case law in external relations generally, in order to 
extrapolate a hypothesis which could be used in the context of the legal relationships 
related to the AFSJ with our immediate neighbours.  
 
The issue of the CJEU’s jurisdiction in the context of the CFSP was recently 
revisited in the Case C-658/11 European Parliament v. Council (re Mauritius 
agreement), with the Court pointing out that “in principle” it did not have jurisdiction 
relating to the CFSP “or with respect to acts adopted on the basis of those provisions” 
(Judgment: paragraph 69). However, in cases where agreements are adopted on the 
basis of a CFSP provision, such as Article 37 TEU, in the case of Mauritius, but that 
the procedural legal basis was based on Article 218 TFEU (Judgment: paragraph 71), 
the CJEU had a role in ensuring “the interpretation and application of the Treaties and 
the law is observed” (Judgment: paragraph 70). Separately, Article 40 TEU provides 
that the CFSP “shall not affect the application of the procedures and extent of the 
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powers of the institutions” under the TFEU, and the TFEU provisions shall not affect 
the operation of the CFSP, leading Cremona to discuss the “Chinese wall” which has 
now been erected between the CFSP and the other Union policies, both “internal and 
external”, with the intention of protecting “both sides” (Cremona 2008, p.45). In 
establishing the legal basis for Euro-Med agreements, it is important to note that 
Euro-Med agreements cover a number of different policy areas, such as trade and 
security. The legal balance in these “cross-pillar” agreements has now shifted, with 
the pre-Lisbon preference for the first pillar the EC under Article 47 EU, (Case C-
91/05; Commission v Council (re SALW), paragraph 29) now being more of an even 
balance between the EU and the CFSP, under Article 40 TEU.  
 
The external development of the AFSJ is dependent on the internal provisions and 
the competence of the EU to operate in this area, under the pre-Lisbon doctrine of 
implied parallel powers for the then EC. There have been lengthy legal academic 
debates on the exact legal relationship between the EU, or its predecessor, the EC, and 
its own member states, (Craig 2004, p.330). Writing during the drafting of the failed 
EU Constitution, Craig pointed out that what is now the EU only has attributed 
competence, namely that “it can only operate within the powers granted to it by the 
Member States”, (Craig 2004, p.324). This provision is provided for, post Lisbon, in 
Article 4.1 TEU, which expressly states that “competences not conferred upon the 
Union in the Treaties remain with the Member States.” Article 5 TEU goes on to 
elaborate the principle of conferral, stating at Article 5.2 that “the Union shall act only 
within the limits of the competences conferred upon it by the Member States in the 
Treaties to attain the objectives set out therein. Competences not conferred upon the 
Union in the Treaties remain with the Member States.” This is an important point in 
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the context of this paper, as there have been clear examples of excluding “certain 
fields of action from Union competence” which has been “particularly prevalent in the 
field of security”, (Mitsilegas 2010, 461).Those Area of Freedom, Security and 
Justice competences which have been transferred to the EU are subject to the 
principles of subsidiarity and proportionality (Article 5.1 TFEU) as the AFSJ is an 
area of shared competence between the EU and the member states (Article 4.2j 
TFEU). Subsidiarity is governed by Article 5.3 TEU, which provides that the  
 
“Union shall act only if and in so far as the objectives of the proposed action 
cannot be sufficiently achieved by the Member States, either at central level 
or at regional and local level, but can rather, by reason of the scale or effects 
of the proposed action, be better achieved at Union level.”  
 
National parliaments, post Lisbon, have a role in defending this principle of 
subsidiarity, (Protocol no. 2, Article 6).  
 
In the context of ex. PJCCM provisions, the subject matter of this paper, Article 
4.2 TEU which provides that Union will respect member’s “essential State functions, 
including ensuring the territorial integrity of the State, maintaining law and order and 
safeguarding national security. In particular, national security remains the sole 
responsibility of each Member State.” This is reinforced by Article 72 TFEU which 
provides that the EU  
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“will not affect the exercise of the responsibilities incumbent upon Member 
States with regard to the maintenance of law and order and the safeguarding 
of internal security.”  
 
This writer would argue that the Article 72 TFEU restrictions on 
interfering in the internal maintenance of law and order and the safeguarding of 
internal security of an EU member state will also limit the impact that EU 
external AFSJ provisions vis à vis the maintenance of law and order and the 
safeguarding of the internal security of a third country. Equally relations with 
third countries could not indirectly affect the internal security of any or even all 
of the EU member states. Internal security in this context is understood to mean 
standard law enforcement functions.  
 
Also Article 73 TFEU provides that it is “open to Member States to 
organise between themselves and under their responsibility such forms of 
cooperation and coordination as they deem appropriate” to deal with issues of 
national security. While a facility is available for the sharing of intelligence, 
through IntCen, which has replaced SitCen, it was “meant to produce 
intelligence that no national agency is willing to produce”, (den Boer 2011, 
p.359). IntCen is answerable to the External Action Service, with the 
intelligence being processed being “far more external and strategic dimension in 
its intelligence-gathering efforts than, for instance, Europol,” (den Boer 2011, 
p.359). There is also not a requirement on national intelligence services, where 
they exist, and they do not exist in all EU member states, to use this facility. In 
addition intelligence produced as this level is provided for “EU decision makers 
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at strategic” rather than the operational level, (den Boer 2011, p.359). Staffing 
of SitCen was reported by den Boer as being predominantly military, with some 
police. National intelligence operatives were not staffing SitCen. Engagement at 
this level for national intelligence services, under EU law, is voluntary. Military 
intelligence services, which are often separate from national security services, 
are more likely to be involved at this EU level, within the intergovernmental 
CFSP legal framework. In engaging with North African countries in the context 
of, say counter-terrorism, drugs trafficking or organised crime, national law 
enforcement services, or Europol will have to conduct their own operational 
focused intelligence analyses.  
 
There is also a debate as to the exact meaning of “internal security” and “national 
security”. Different countries will see their security threats differently, and will react 
differently if they think the threat is one of, for example, organised crime, foreign 
espionage, or a military threat. As stated by Mitsilegas, “the Treaty refers to national 
security and internal security, viewed primarily from a national perspective,” 
(Mitsilegas 2010, p.461). Mitsilegas refers to the UK approach which sees the two 
terms as being distinct, with internal security being a matter of traditional law 
enforcement activities, and illegal immigration. He speculates that national security 
would cover “military and/or intelligence action,” and goes on to call for clarification 
of these issues now that the Lisbon Treaty is in force, (Mitsilegas 2010, p.461). It is 
possible that this clarification will not be forthcoming, as different countries will view 
different threats in different ways, with these views changing to meet evolving and 
developing threats. 
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The issue of which legal basis to be used by the EU in developing its external 
aspects of the AFSJ, as opposed to exclusively or predominantly provisions based on 
the CFSP need to be examined. Different treaty provisions allow for different external 
activities, and prescribe different internal institutional procedures. As stated by the 
Court in Case C-130/10; European Parliament v. Council (Kadi), (paragraph 80), “it 
is not procedures that define the legal basis of a measure but the legal basis of a 
measure that determines the procedures to be followed in adopting that measure”. 
This sentiment has often been repeated in CJEU cases. In addition, AG Bot, in his 
opinion in Kadi (Opinion, paragraph 56), “The choice of the legal basis or a European 
Union measure must rest on objective factors amenable to judicial review, which 
include in particular the aim and the content of the measure”.  
 
 In the first of three recent cases on external competence of the EU, post 
Lisbon, the Kadi case pointed out, at paragraph 27 of the ruling, that Protocol (No 21) 
on the position of the United Kingdom and Ireland in respect of the area of freedom, 
security and justice, and Protocol (No 22) on the position of Denmark further 
complicates the issue of competence in respect of the external relations of the EU in 
the AFSJ, requiring the UK, Ireland and Denmark to expressly opt in to any 
provisions in order to be bound by that provision. The Kadi case legal argument 
revolved around  the choice of either Article 75 TFEU or Article 215 TFEU in the 
limited context of financial sanctions against an individual in a counter-terrorism 
financing case. The CJEU ruled (paragraph 64) that Article 43(1) TEU “makes it clear 
that all the tasks covered by the common security and defence policy ‘may contribute 
to the fight against terrorism, including by supporting third countries in combating 
terrorism in their territories’”. Equally the EU has competence to act in external AFSJ 
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provisions more generally, with policing and justice provisions featuring in Case C-
658/11; European Parliament v. Council (re Mauritius agreement) and repatriation of 
illegal immigrants featuring in Case C-377/12; Commission v. Council (re Philippines 
agreement), in light of the provisions of Article 21.2 TEU which provides that the EU 
“shall work for a high degree of cooperation in all fields of international relations in 
order to” inter alia, “safeguard its values, fundamental interests, security, 
independence and integrity”. The focus therefore would appear to be narrower in the 
context of the AFSJ, generally requiring the protection of the EU’s interests, while 
safeguarding third countries’ interests in the context of counter-terrorism is permitted 
under CJEU ruling in Kadi, above. Given that the EU is required to balance security 
with freedom and justice in the AFSJ, it is worth noting that the CJEU in Kadi 
(paragraph 83) stated that “it is to be noted that the duty to respect fundamental rights 
is imposed, in accordance with Article 51(1) of the Charter of Fundamental Rights of 
the European Union, on all the institutions and bodies of the Union.” The two articles 
in question in that case, (Judgment: paragraph 83) Article 75 TFEU and Article 
215(3) TFEU, both included “necessary provisions on legal safeguards.”  
 
The Kadi case addressed the legal basis of measures imposing financial 
sanctions against Kadi in a counter-terrorism context. While Article 215 TFEU 
expressly refers to “financial relations with one or more countries” and Article 75 
TFEU referred to “financial assets or economic gains belonging to, or owned or held 
by, natural or legal persons, groups or non-State entities”, this point was ignored in 
the final ruling. Rather the fact that Kadi was placed on a UN list, pursuant to Security 
Council Resolution 1390/2002, which was followed by the EU by Common Position 
2002/402 on behalf of the CFSP, and then Regulation 881/2002 was the key point. 
16 
 
The internal measures against Kadi were taken as a result of external CFSP 
commitments to the UN Security Council. As the procedures under Article 75 TFEU 
and Article 215 TFEU are different, with Article 75 TFEU requiring the involvement 
of both the European Parliament and the Council, and Article 215 TFEU being the 
Council only, acting by a qualified majority voting procedure, then, following Case 
C-300/89; Commission v. Council (Titanium dioxide), “recourse to a dual legal basis 
is not possible where the procedures laid down for each legal basis are incompatible 
with each other”, (Judgment: paragraph 45). A choice therefore had to be made 
between these two articles, with the Court stating that “restrictive measures relating to 
terrorism….must be adopted under the FEU Treaty following a CFSP decision further 
to a Security Council Resolution, Article 215 TFEU is the only possible legal basis”. 
(Judgment: paragraph 27).  
 
 The Philippines case was the first of two 2014 rulings to emerge from the 
CJEU, with the Mauritius ruling following within the same month. The Philippines 
case involved a conflict between the Common Commercial Policy (Article 207 
TFEU) and the Development Policy, (Article 209 TFEU). The CJEU held in the 
Philippines case (Judgment: paragraph 34) that if a measure had a “twofold purpose,” 
with one dominant and other subservient, then the measures can be “founded on a 
single legal basis, namely, that required by the main or predominant purpose or 
component”. However, if the two measures “are inseparably linked” and of equal 
weight, then “the measure must be founded on the various corresponding legal basis.” 
However, if the two legal bases “are incompatible with each other”, “then recourse of 
a dual legal basis is not possible” (Kadi judgment: paragraph 45).  
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This is an important issue in the context of the AFSJ, as internally, judicial co-
operation in criminal matters, under Article 82 TFEU uses the ordinary legislative 
procedure, involving both the Council and the European Parliament. However this 
procedure can be suspended under Article 82.3 if an EU member states is of the view 
that the draft directive “would affect fundamental aspects of its criminal justice 
system” with the matter being referred to the European Council for resolution. The 
matter can then be referred back by the European Council for completion following 
the ordinary legislative procedure, or the matter could proceed following measures for 
enhanced cooperation if at least nine member states still want to proceed. Article 86 
TFEU, however, deploys the special legislative procedure for the establishment of the 
European Public Prosecutors Office, a matter which is unlikely to affect the external 
relations of the EU in the AFSJ. The ordinary legislative procedure is also dominant 
for police cooperation under Article 87 TFEU. However, in an area which is likely to 
affect the external aspects of the AFSJ, operational cooperation between authorities is 
to be established by the Council, acting unanimously, after consulting the European 
Parliament, under Article 87.3 TFEU. The special legislative procedure, with the 
Council acting unanimously, after consulting the European Parliament, appears again 
in Article 89 TFEU, when judicial staff (Article 82 TFEU), or police, to include 
“customs and other specialised law enforcement services in relation to the prevention, 
detection and investigation of criminal offences” (Article 87 TFEU) are operating “in 
the territory of another Member State in liaison and in agreement with the authorities 
of that State”. The possibilities for dual legal basis for even a specialised external 
AFSJ agreement, not including development co-operation, focusing just on police and 
judicial cooperation, therefore reduce quite considerably. Specialised external 
agreements, relying on just one treaty basis, will have to be entered into. 
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The Philippines case went on to say (Judgment: paragraph 44), that “even if a 
measure contributes to the economic and social development of developing countries, 
it does not fall within development cooperation policy [which can be legislated for 
under Article 209 TFEU] “if it has as its main purpose the implementation of another 
policy” such as the AFSJ. In this particular case the CJEU held that (paragraph 59), 
the “provisions… relating to readmission of nationals” etc. did “not contain 
obligations so extensive” that they were considered even as secondary or indirectly 
related to the main purposes of the agreement. There was a reference to readmission 
of nationals, but no detail as to how this was to be done. A follow up agreement was 
required to put this provision into effect (Judgment: paragraph 58). This author would 
argue that such a subsequent, specialised agreement might well be entered into 
pursuant to Article 8 TEU, if that article is to be given any specific significance within 
the post-Lisbon treaty framework. 
 
Of the three recent cases, Case C-658/11; European Parliament v. Council (re 
Mauritius agreement) had the most substantive AFSJ related measures. This, in 
addition to the usual development cooperation provisions, also had justice, policing 
and EUNAVFOR related provisions. The CJEU referred expressly, (Judgment: 
paragraph 52), to Article 218 TFEU, which is to be seen as providing the “single 
procedure of general application” with provisions on both the negotiation and 
conclusion of agreements “which the European Union is competent to conclude in the 
fields of its activity, including the CFSP, expect where the Treaties lay down special 
procedures”. As stated in the Mauritius case (Judgment: paragraph 72), “Article 218 
TFEU is of general application” and is “intended to apply … to all international 
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agreements negotiated and concluded by the European Union is all fields of activity, 
including the CFSP, which, unlike other fields, is not subject to any special 
procedure”. Special procedures are provided in the treaties for the Common 
Commercial Policy (Article 207 TFEU), Development Policy (Article 208 TFEU) and 
Economic, Financial and Technical Cooperation with third countries (Article 212 
TFEU). 
 
Important here is that the EU has competence to act in certain areas of the AFSJ, 
and within certain constraints, as referred to earlier. As pointed out by the CJEU, 
Article 218 TFEU provides for three types of procedures, with the CJEU in the 
Mauritius case stating (Judgment: paragraph 55), “that distinction is designed to 
reflect externally the division of powers between institutions that applies internally.” 
Either the measure is exclusively or principally a common foreign and security policy 
measure, which an detailed AFSJ measure would not be, or the Council will adopt the 
measure after obtaining the consent of the European Parliament, for specific types of 
agreements, (Article 218.6.a TFEU). These include association agreements under 
Article 217 TFEU. These could cover measures which internal to the EU would use 
the ordinary legislative procedure. It would be possible to also have a general 
reference to measures which would need a special legislative procedure, as in the 
Philippines case, but the more detailed provisions would have to be in a later 
agreement, which would have to respect the special legislative procedure. That later, 
more detailed AFSJ agreement would need to follow the third option in Article 
218.6.b. with the Council operating “after consulting the European Parliament”. It is 
to be noted that the Article 218.6.b. option would normally have the Council acting by 
a qualified majority (Article 218.8.) however the provision itself provides that the 
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Council “shall act unanimously when the agreement covers a field for which 
unanimity is required for the adoption of a Union act”. The issue of the possibility of 
having to refer a matter to the European Council to be resolved is not covered, leading 
this writer to recommend that any problematic external provisions should first have 
been legislated for internally. In addition the UK, Irish and Danish opt out provisions 
under their various AFSJ protocols would have to be addressed in the context of 
related external AFSJ provisions. The internal shared competences, subsidiarity and 
treaty limitations on the AFSJ would also have to be reflected in any external 
provisions with third countries or organisations.  
 
 
C. Security strategies 
 
 
The Strategy for the External Dimension of JHA, for its part, speaks of an 
increasingly interconnected world, with the need for the EU to make JHA issues a 
central priority in its dealing with third countries (paragraph 1). It speaks of the need 
to “respond to the security threats of terrorism, organised crime, corruption and drugs 
and to the challenge of managing migration flows”. This needs to be done in the 
context of “strengthening the rule of law, and promoting the respect for human rights 
and international obligations” (paragraph 1). The external JHA strategy does say that 
JHA issues are not “dealt with as consistently as they might be” (paragraph 13).  
 
While the various UN treaties on organised crime, drug trafficking, and the 
protocol to the Palermo Convention on human trafficking would provide a shared 
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understanding of these crimes with North African states, there is no such UN treaty on 
terrorism. The EU’s definition on terrorism, set out in Council Framework Decision 
2002/475/JHA, would have to be used in external relations of the EU with regard to 
any external counter-terrorism activity. Its reception as a definition will have to be 
examined in the North African jurisdictions. The EU hopes that the Mediterranean 
countries will adopt and implement laws in line with the Euro-Mediterranean Code of 
Conduct on Countering Terrorism 2005. This was drafted by British diplomats after 
the Council of Ministers of Justice of the Arab League drafted a Convention on 
Terrorism in 1998 which was internationally criticized due to the vagueness of their 
definitions. This code defines terrorism as a common threat for EuroMed citizens, 
(Wolff 2010, p.145). The code requires members to “exchange information on a 
voluntary basis on terrorists and their support networks”, requiring members to work 
bilaterally to develop effective and operational co-operation, (EEAS 2005, p.1). 
Denying a safe haven for terrorists and refusing them asylum is required, as is the 
sharing of best practices and expertise, to include technical assistance, (EEAS 2005). 
Regional commercial agreements, such as the Agidir Agreement 2001 are testament 
to the fact that the North African countries are more than capable of making their own 
arrangements in their own geographic space, independent of both the EU and the 
EU’s other ENP/ Euro-Med partners, if necessary. The Euro-Med code of conduct 
emphasises the need to, inter alia, promote good governance and human rights, and to 
promote respect for all religions and intercultural understanding, (EEAS 2005, p.2). 
There are a number of minority groups in the North African countries which would 
benefit from the adoption of these principles. These statements are also in line of the 
EU’s own anti-radicalisation programmes (Commission 2005). The code expressly 
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states that its members will “reject any attempts to associate terrorism with any 
nation, culture or religion,” (EEAS 2005, p.2).  
 
In addition to relations with the EU, it is worth noting that many North 
African states still maintain close historical ties with individual EU member states. In 
particular “France has historically maintained close relations with the intelligence 
services of North African countries,” (Wolff 2010, p.148) with the Madrid bombing 
in 2004 leading to an increase in Spanish-Moroccan cooperation, (Wolff 2010, p.149). 
It would be expected that these bi-lateral relations would continue. Post the Arab 
Spring, there is a potential for regional understandings, and cooperation to develop, in 
particular in North Africa, to the mutual benefit of all in the region.  
 
 
D. Relations with the North African countries  
 
 
In examining the development of the external dimension of the AFSJ using the 
constructivism and constitutional perspectives, it is important to note that various 
North African countries have requested that the EU focus on the issue of drugs 
trafficking. Commentators have been asking if the EU “has the leverage” to “incite 
these countries to cooperate on controversial issues”, (Lavenex 2011, p.120). A 
shared interest in tackling a particular crime area, will lead to “strong incentives for 
adaptation” (Lavenex 2011, p.122) in the absence of the traditional carrot of EU 
membership. In contrast with Lavenex, this author would argue that the JHA acquis 
covers both “the rule of law and respect for human rights,” (Lavenex 2011, p.123), 
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with the CJEU in Kadi (paragraph 83) (as referred to above) stating that “it is to be 
noted that the duty to respect fundamental rights is imposed, in accordance with 
Article 51(1) of the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union, on all the 
institutions and bodies of the Union.” The development of a multi-layered practitioner 
and policy maker’s framework through “networked governance”, while developing 
any new area of operation, using Onuf style constructivism, all parties still have to 
operate within their own legal frameworks, to include, for example, those binding 
individual drug trafficking officers which operate within informal drugs trafficking 
networks, and the laws which bind EU’s own agencies, Europol and Frontex. An EU 
based drugs trafficking officer will have little interest in a transnational law 
enforcement operation involving drugs and organised crime if a safe conviction is not 
obtainable in some EU member state. Equally he or she is prescribed by relevant 
practice manuals as to how to operate, either within a particular EU policing 
framework or legal jurisdiction, or when acting on behalf of an EU agency. Equally, 
the opening of negotiations will have to be approved through legal provisions at EU - 
North African state level, which should set out the parameters for the negotiations, 
and any finalised agreements would have to be similarly concluded. These are all 
opportunities to ensure that there is a proper balance maintained between security and 
freedom and justice provisions. These approaches and the underlying legal and 
operational frameworks will inform an Onuf style constructivism in relevant 
“networked governance” arrangements. As Lavenex has said herself “trust is unlikely 
to grow if the basic institutional preconditions guaranteeing the respect for common 
values are not in place,” (Lavenex 2011, p.122). Nevertheless, Cardwell’s observation 
that “constructivists claim that social realities only exist by human agreement through 
intersubjective understanding, and are therefore susceptible to change,” (Cardwell 
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2009, p.75), needs to be avoided when it comes to EU due process and fundamental 
rights, when engaging with third countries, or any attempt to forum shop, with the 
preference being to operate or litigate in a jurisdiction merely because it has lower 
fundamental or due process standards. The traditional constructivist approach to the 
development of EU law enforcement and security strategies is now encountering, 
within the EU, an increasing constitutionalisation of the EU legal framework, 
highlighting significant legal tensions. As Nuotio has pointed out, criminal law, “is 
replete with values and ideologies, which are had to avoid wherever and however the 
field is addressed,” (Nuotio 2011, p.332). These values and ideologies are not yet 
fixed at the EU level, even before we consider the EU’s legal relationships with third 
countries, with the basic principles of the EU, set out in particular in the EU Charter, 
but also in the ECHR and the shared constitutional traditions of the EU member state, 
still needing to be robustly built into the EU AFSJ legal framework. 
 
None of the North African states have either operational or strategic 
agreements with Europol, although successful cross-border law enforcement 
operations have been conducted. Europol was authorised to open negotiations with 
Morocco as far back as 2000, (Council Decision of 27 March 2000), none of the other 
North African countries having got that far. However no agreement, either strategic or 
operational, has so far been signed with either Morocco, or any other county in North 
Africa. The Europol Review 2011 does refer to the launching of an online platform 
for experts on “North Africa and Middle East Uprising” (page 24). The European 
Judicial Network-crime (EJN) seems to be maintaining a broader range of network 
contacts than either Europol or Eurojust, maintaining networks with both the Platform 
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of Judicial cooperation from the Sahel Countries, which includes Mauritania,3 the 
Moroccan network of international judicial cooperation, which deals with both civil 
and criminal matters, and the EuroMed Justice III project. This is all part of a general 
global trend to develop regional judicial networks in order to combat serious 
transnational crime, the fruits of which still have to be established.   
 
The EuroMed Justice III project, which is running from 2011-2014, is 
focusing on supporting the development of the partners’ capacity and backing the 
modernisation of justice, including an improved access to justice. The EuroMed 
Police III, also running from 2011 to 2014,4 is focusing on enhanced cooperation 
on counter-terrorism, THB, money laundering, drug trafficking, financial crimes, 
weapons trafficking, to include CBRN,5 cyber-crime and new forms of criminal 
offences. The general political framework seems now to be sufficiently in place to 
lead to greater law enforcement practitioner engagement with most of the North 
African countries, with the first conference of the General Directors of Police and 
Security forces of EU and ENPI South countries held in Madrid (Spain) on the 11 
July 2012, on the topic of “Fight against Drug-Trafficking and Money-
Laundering”, with all of the beneficiaries, with the exception of Tunisia, sending 
delegates to the meeting. Europol, Interpol and CEPOL were also present as were 
delegations form 20 of the EU’s 27 member states. 
 
                                                          
3
 Documents for which are available on the UNDOC web site, under legal tools - international 
cooperation networks. 
4
 The beneficiaries of Euromed Police III are the People's Democratic Republic of Algeria, the Arab 
Republic of Egypt, Israel, the Kingdom of Jordan, Lebanon, (suspended, the Syrian Arab Republic), 
the Kingdom of Morocco, the Palestinian Authority and the Republic of Tunisia. 
5
 Chemical, Biological, Nuclear and Radiological attack. 
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One example of interesting developments in the area of both police and 
judicial cooperation is with Tunisia. In addition to participating in EuroMed II-
Police, the Tunisian Ministry of Interior has been working with the International 
Organisation for Francophones, to obtain French experts for the training of police, 
to deal with the elections and to secure tourist areas, (Commission 2012). It is 
therefore reasonable to expect that this Tunisian-French cooperation will develop 
further in the future. In the area of criminal justice, the EU issued a list of 
recommendations in June 2011, in order to improve judicial cooperation to include 
Tunisia joining the CoE Convention on the Transfer of Sentenced Persons, of 
convention of 1983 (Commission 2012, p.12). The report anticipates the 
development of an action programme which is being developed by the EU in 
conjunction with the Tunisian authorities. A cooperation unit has been set up 
between Tunisia, Eurojust and 8 EU member states, to deal with the recovery of 
assets transferred abroad by the Ben Ali family. Further work, in conjunction with 
the World Bank, is anticipated in the recovery of the Ben Ali frozen assets, 
(Commission 2012, p.13). 
 
Regional cross border law enforcement initiatives, outside Interpol, are less 
common. However in the EU’s external neighbourhood, both the South East 
European Law Enforcement Centre (SELEC)6 and the Central Asian Regional 
                                                          
6
 Whose membership comprises Albania, Bosnia & Herzegovina, Bulgaria, Croatia, Greece, Hungary, 
FRY Macedonia, Moldova, Montenegro, Romania, Serbia, Slovenia and Turkey. 
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Information and Coordination Centre (CARICC),7 in Kazakhstan, provide models for 
possible developments in North Africa.8  
 
 
E. Conclusions  
 
There is clearly a drive to develop external AFSJ relations with North African 
countries for operational reasons. If this process is to develop it is necessary to pin 
down exactly where the competences for these developments are provided for in the 
EU treaties, and to what extent the EU is actually vested with competence to act vis à 
vis its legal relationships with its own member states. Some clarity on these points are 
beginning to emerge with recent CJEU case law. In addition, it is necessary to 
develop the correct methodological approach to the development of these 
relationships if they are to be effective, not just from a law enforcement practitioner 
perspective, but also from a law and justice perspective. It is for this reason that a 
multi-layered law enforcement practitioner led “networked governance” model, which 
appears to correctly reflect what is actually happening on the ground, but embedded in 
the legal and justice frameworks of the EU and its member states represent the best 
approach for progress. This author would argue that adopting an Onuf style 
constructivism, allied to a constitutionalisation approach would provide the most 
effective analytical framework, both for understanding the processes in play, and 
                                                          
7
 Whose membership comprises Azerbaijan, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyz Republic, Russian Federation, 
Tajikistan, Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan.  
8
 For a further discussion on the SELEC and CARICC and their relationships with the EU see O’Neill 
2013. 
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ensuring that the final result of these developments are acceptable within the EU legal 
and justice framework. 
 
Given that the traditional carrot for the adoption of the EU acquis, 
membership of the EU is not on offer to the North African states, developments are 
much more likely in areas of direct interest to the North African states, namely drug 
trafficking, where openness to EU operational standards and norms is much more 
likely. Even within the EU drugs trafficking was the first developed, with Europol 
originally called the European Drugs Unit. As the level of trust and mutual 
understanding developed in the EU, member states were prepared to develop into 
other areas. It was only post 9/11 that the EU member states themselves were 
prepared to countenance any cross border cooperation in the area of counter-terrorism. 
It is to be presumed that effective cooperation with and between North African states 
will follow along the same path. There is a need for the North African countries to see 
tangible benefits arising in their relationship with the EU. 
 
This author is of the view that aiming to effectively cooperate in the area of 
counter-terrorism, in particular cross border law enforcement operations, a subject 
matter in which the EU itself has limited capacity vis à vis its own member states, 
before a level of trust and understanding has developed in areas such as drugs 
trafficking, is, in the view of this author, approaching the problem from the wrong 
direction. It is to be hoped that traditional bi-lateral relationships between individual 
North African states, and individual EU member states will address any cross border 
counter-terrorism issues that will arise in practice in the meantime. The Spanish 
Minister of the Interior is already talking about facilitating “the development of 
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multidisciplinary investigation teams with third States,” (Rubalcaba 2011, p.19). 
Tackling the transnational drug trafficking route from North Africa into Spain would 
be an interesting first cross-border law enforcement project. The correct legal 
framework and methodological approach needs to be in place in order to ensure that 
these opportunities are properly developed, for the benefit of EU internal security, and 
the AFSJ in general, as well as for the benefit of the relevant North African state. 
 
 
References: 
 
Books 
 
Cardwell P.J., 2009. EU external relations and systems of governance, the CFSP, 
Euro-Mediterranean partnership and migration. Oxford: Routledge. 
Gibbs A.H., 2011. Constitutional Life and Europe’s Area of Freedom, Security and 
Justice, Asghate, Surrey. 
 
Book chapters 
 
Cremona, M. 2008. Defining competence in EU external relations: lessons from the 
Treaty reform process. In: A. Dashwood and M. Maresceau eds. Law and practice of 
EU external relations; salient features of a changing landscape. Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 34-69. 
30 
 
Dashwood A. and Maresceau, M. 2008, Editorial. In: A. Dashwood and M. 
Maresceau eds. Law and practice of EU external relations; salient features of a 
changing landscape. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 6-10. 
den Boer, M., 2011. Soft, Smart and Strategic. The International Dimension of EU 
Action in the Fight Against Terrorism. In M. Cremona, J. Monar, & S. Poli, eds. The 
External Dimension of the European Union’s Area of Freedom, Security and Justice, 
College of Europe studies, Brussels: P.I. E. Peter Lang, 341-366. 
Lavenex S. 2011. Channels of externalisation of EU Justice and Home Affairs. In M. 
Cremona, J. Monar, & S. Poli, eds. The External Dimension of the European Union’s 
Area of Freedom, Security and Justice, College of Europe studies, Brussels: P.I. E. 
Peter Lang, 119-138. 
Mac Amhlaigh, C.; The European Union’s Constitutional Mosaic: Big “C” or small 
“c”, Is that the Question?. In N. Walker and S. Tierney eds. A constitutional Mosaic? 
Exploring the New Frontiers of Europe’s Constitutionalism, Hart Publishing, 2011, 
21-48. 
Nuotio, K., 2011. European Criminal Law under the Developing constitutional Setting 
of the European Union. In N. Walker and S. Tierney, eds. A constitutional Mosaic? 
Exploring the New Frontiers of Europe’s Constitutionalism. Hart Publishing, 311-
338. 
O’Neill, M., 2013. Trafficking in Human Beings and the Eastern Neighbours; new 
challenges for the EU justice and law enforcement framework. In M. O’Neill, K. 
Swinton, and A. Winter, eds. New Challenges for EU Internal Security Strategy, 
Newcastle upon Tyne: Cambridge Scholars, 188-216.  
Rijken C., 2001. The External dimension of EU Policy on Trafficking in Human 
Beings. In M. Cremona, J. Monar and S. Poli eds. The External Dimension of the 
31 
 
European Union’s Area of Freedom, Security and Justice, College of Europe studies, 
Brussels: P.I.E. Peter Lang, 209-238. 
Rubalcaba A.P., 2011. Preface. In M. Cremona, J. Monar & S. Poli eds. The External 
Dimension of the European Union’s Area of Freedom, Security and Justice, College 
of Europe studies, Brussels: P.I. E. Peter Lang, 17-21. 
Wolff S., 2010. The Mediterranean dimension of EU Counter-terrorism. In: S. Wolff, 
N. Wichmann and G. Mounier, eds. The external dimension of justice and home 
affairs: a different security agenda for the European Union? Abingdon: Routledge, 
135-154. 
Zeilinger, B. 2012. The EU’s external policy towards Eastern Europe on migration 
issues. In E. Stadtmüller and K. Bachmann eds. The EU’s Shifting Borders; 
Theoretical approaches and policy implications in the new neighbourhood. Oxford: 
Routledge, 60-80. 
 
Journal Articles  
 
Craig, P., 2004. Competence: clarity, conferral, containment and consideration. 
European Law Review, 29 (3), 323-334. 
Hakura, F.S., 1997. The Euro-Mediterranean policy: the implications of the Barcelona 
declaration. Common Market Law Review, 34(2): 337-366. 
Mitsilegas, V.; 2010. European Criminal Law and Resistance to Communautarisation 
after Lisbon, New Journal of European Criminal Law, 1(4), 458 – 480. 
 
Other 
 
32 
 
Jonathan Cristol, Constructivism, Oxford Bibliographies (online). 
http://www.oxfordbibliographies.com/view/document/obo-9780199743292/obo-
9780199743292-0061.xml. 
 
 
Legislation  
 
Treaty documents  
 
CoE Convention on the Transfer of Sentenced Persons, CETS No.: 112. 
Protocol (No 2) on the application of the principles of subsidiarity and proportionality 
attached to the TEU and TFEU post-Lisbon. 
Protocol (No 21) on the position of the United Kingdom and Ireland in respect of the 
area of freedom, security and justice. 
Protocol (No 22) on the position of Denmark. 
Protocol (No 36) on Transitional Provisions. 
Treaty on the European Union. 
Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union. 
 
Secondary legislation 
 
Council Decision of 27 March 2000 authorising the Director of Europol to enter into 
negotiations on agreements with third States and non-EU related bodies, OJ C 106, 
13/04/2000, 1. 
33 
 
Council Common Position of 27 May 2002 concerning restrictive measures against 
Usama bin Laden, members of the Al-Qaida organisation and the Taliban and other 
individuals, groups, undertakings and entities associated with them and repealing 
Common Positions 96/746/CFSP, 1999/727/CFSP, 2001/154/CFSP and 
2001/771/CFSP, OJ L 139, 29/05/2002, 4. 
Council Regulation (EC) No 881/2002 of 27 May 2002 imposing certain specific 
restrictive measures directed against certain persons and entities associated with 
Usama bin Laden, the Al-Qaida network and the Taliban, and repealing Council 
Regulation (EC) No 467/2001 prohibiting the export of certain goods and services to 
Afghanistan, strengthening the flight ban and extending the freeze of funds and other 
financial resources in respect of the Taliban of Afghanistan, OJ L 139, 29/05/2002, 9. 
Council Framework Decision 2002/475/JHA of 13 June 2002 on combating terrorism, 
OJ L 164, 22/06/2002, 3, as amended by Council Framework Decision 2008/919/JHA 
of 28 November 2008 amending Framework Decision 2002/475/JHA on combating 
terrorism, OJ L 330, 09/12/2008, 21. 
UN Security Council, Security Council resolution 1390 (2002) on the situation in 
Afghanistan, 16 January 2002, S/RES/1390 (2002). 
 
 
Case law  
Case C-658/11 European Parliament v Council (re Mauritius) [2014] ECR 0000. 
Case C-377/12 Commission v Council (re Philippines) [2014] ECR 0000. 
Case C-130/10 European Parliament v Council (Kadi) [2012] ECR 0000. 
Case C-91/05; Commission v Council (re SALW), [2008] ECR I-03651. 
 
34 
 
Policy Documents  
 
Commission (2012) Document de travail conjoint des services, Mise en oeuvre de la 
Politique Europénne de Voisinage en Tunisie, Progrès réalisés en 2011 et actions à 
mettre en oeuvre, accompagnant le document : Communication conjointe au 
Parlement Européen, au Conseil, au Comité Économique et Social Européen et au 
Comité des Régions Concrétiser les engagements de la nouvelle Politique Europeénne 
de Voisinage, Bruxelles, le 15.5.2012, SWD(2012) 123 final. 
Commission (2011c) Mid-Term Review of the Country Strategy Paper Morocco 
2007-2013 and National Indicative Program 2011-2013, 2011. [online] Available 
from http://ec.europa.eu/world/enp/pdf/country/2011_enpi_csp_nip_morocco_en.pdf. 
[Accessed 23 August 2013]. 
Commission (2011d) European Neighbourhood & Partnership Instrument Cross-
Border Cooperation (CBC) Multi-annual Indicative Programme 2011-2013. [online] 
Available from http://ec.europa.eu/world/enp/docs/2011-
2013_crossborder_mip_en.pdf. [Accessed 23 August 2013]. 
Commission (2010) Communication from the Commission to the European 
Parliament and the Council; The EU Internal Security Strategy in Action: Five steps 
towards a more secure Europe, COM/2010/0673 final. 
Commission (2007) European Neighbourhood & Partnership Instrument Cross-
Border Cooperation Strategy Paper 2007-2013 Indicative Programme 2007-2010. 
[online] Available from http://ec.europa.eu/world/enp/pdf/country/enpi_cross-
border_cooperation_strategy_paper_en.pdf. [Accessed 23 August 2013]. 
Commission (2005) Communication from the Commission to the European 
Parliament and the Council concerning terrorist recruitment: addressing the factors 
35 
 
contributing to violent radicalisation [COM (2005) 313 final - Not published in the 
Official Journal]: and the European Union Strategy for Combating Radicalisation and 
Recruitment to Terrorism, Brussels, 24 November 2005, 14781/1/05. 
Council of the European Union (2008); Report on the Implementation of the 
European Security Strategy - Providing Security in a Changing World - Brussels, 11 
December 2008, S407/08. 
Council of the European Union (2005a); The European Union Counter-Terrorism 
Strategy, Brussels, 30 November 2005, 14469/4/05. 
Council of the European Union (2005b) Commission Communication: A Strategy for 
the External Dimension of JHA: Global Freedom, Security and Justice, Brussels 30th 
November 2005, 14366/3/05. 
Council of the European Union (2003); A Secure Europe in a Better World, European 
Security Strategy, Brussels, 12 December 2003.[online] Available from 
http://www.consilium.europa.eu/uedocs/cmsUpload/78367.pdf. [Accessed 23 August 
2013]. 
European Council (2009) Stockholm Programme, 17024/09. 
EEAS (2005) European External Action Service/ Euro-Med: Euro-Mediterranean 
Code of Conduct on Countering Terrorism, 2005, [online] Available from 
http://www.eeas.europa.eu/euromed/summit1105/terrorism_en.pdf. [Accessed 23 
August 2013]. 
Europol Review 2011 [online] Available from 
https://www.europol.europa.eu/sites/default/files/publications/en_europolreview2011
_0.pdf. [Accessed 23 August 2013]. 
 
Press release 
36 
 
 
MEMO/12/728, Brussels, 2nd October 2012, [online] Available from 
http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_MEMO-12-728_fr.htm. [Accessed 23 August 
2013]. 
 
Websites 
http://enpi-info.eu/mainmed.php?id=392&id_type=10. [Accessed 23 August 2013]. 
http://www.agadiragreement.org/Home.aspx. [Accessed 23 August 2013].  
http://www.caricc.org/index.php?lang=english. [Accessed 23 August 2013].  
http://www.ejn-crimjust.europa.eu/ejn/. [Accessed 23 August 2013]. 
http://www.euromed-justice.eu/. [Accessed 23 August 2013]. 
https://www.europol.europa.eu/content/moroccan-based-drugs-network-dismantled. 
[Accessed 23 August 2013]. 
http://www.secicenter.org/. [Accessed 23 August 2013]. 
 
